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Liability Insurance, Moral Luck, and
Auto Accidents
Tom Baker *
Abstract
Beginning with the seminal work by Williams and Nagel, moral philosophers have used auto
accident hypotheticals to illustrate the phenomenon of moral luck. Moral luck occurs in the
hypotheticals because (and to the extent that) two equally careless drivers are assessed
differently because only one of them caused an accident. This article considers whether these
philosophical discussions might contribute to the public policy debate over compensation for
auto accidents. Using liability and insurance practices in the United States as an illustrative
example, the article explains that auto liability insurance substantially mitigates moral luck and
argues that, as a result, the moral luck literature is unlikely to make a significant contribution to
this public policy debate. That debate would benefit more from philosophical analysis of victims’
luck, which is not as substantially mitigated by liability insurance.

INTRODUCTION
This Article examines auto liability and insurance in the light of philosophical work on moral
luck. Torts and insurance scholars are accustomed to considering the impact of luck on people
injured in auto accidents. In a fault-based system, only the people who are “lucky” enough to be
injured by a careless driver are eligible to receive tort compensation. 1 People who are injured by
someone who was not careless, or who are injured because of their own carelessness, are left to
their own devices, which one hopes include health insurance, sick leave, and a supportive
family. 2 This is the familiar problem of victims’ luck in the auto liability context.
The moral luck literature highlights a different aspect of luck in tort law, one that affects
potential defendants. For example, careless drivers who are unlucky and injure someone are liable
for tort damages, while careless drivers who are lucky suffer no consequences for conduct that, ex
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ante, is equally blameworthy. This is the implication for automobile accidents of what is
considered a broader moral luck phenomenon in tort law.
In this Article, I describe the moral luck problem and evaluate whether liability insurance
mitigates luck in tort law in the auto accident context. I then evaluate the claim that concerns
about moral luck provide a basis for preferring no-fault over the fault-based approach to auto
liability and compensation currently prevailing in the U.S. There are a variety of combinations of
fault and no-fault liability adopted in other countries; although this Article does not address these
other approaches directly, the conclusions should apply to any liability regime accompanied by
mandatory liability insurance.
After taking auto liability insurance into account, the impact of liability on unlucky
drivers is small in the vast majority of cases. Auto insurance very nearly eliminates the serious
financial consequences of liability for defendants. And auto insurance mitigates whatever
additional blame might be thought to follow from labeling some drivers who cause accidents as
tortfeasors. Thus, although it may be desirable to eliminate fault from the auto liability and
compensation equation (an important question that is beyond the scope of this Article), concerns
about the impact of luck on defendants do not provide much support for that conclusion.
As demonstrated by the questions not addressed, the scope of this Article is modest.
There exists a debate in and in reaction to corrective justice literature regarding the moral
justification of existing tort doctrine. Moral luck and related arguments about luck in liability
form the basis for one line of attack on the corrective justice defense of negligence liability. 3 My
goal here is neither to defend nor attack fault, but rather to suggest that liability insurance
provides a sufficient practical answer to the moral luck arguments against fault in the auto
accident context, so that tort theorists can set this debate aside and return to the more difficult
problem of luck as it relates to the victims of accidents. 4
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I. MORAL LUCK IN THE AUTO ACCIDENT CONTEXT
The moral luck problem follows from the role that luck plays in assessments of moral standing.
Of course, luck plays a major role in life (absent an understanding of Divine Providence that I do
not lightly reject but will for present purposes completely ignore). Matters subject to luck include
much of the life paths that made us into who and what we are: who our parents are, where we
went to school, whether our teenage escapades produced lasting harm, which potential life
partners we met, where they were in their lives at that moment, what social connections we made,
what job opportunities we encountered, and so on. The moral luck problem is that the outcomes
that depend on chance include not only the three units of measurement in the Game of Life
(money, fame, and happiness), but also moral worth.
To illustrate the idea of moral luck, Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel famously used
the example of a painter, an imaginary version of Gauguin, who abandons his wife and children
to run off to the South Pacific to paint. 5 Surely a bad thing to do (in my view at least), but just
how bad depends on whether Gauguin’s paintings turn out to be Great. Does he survive the
journey? Do vandals destroy the paintings? Do the critics recognize their greatness? 6 Most
importantly for Gauguin’s own moral assessment of his decision, does he really have the
necessary vision, and the talent and commitment to realize that vision on the canvas? Does he
really need to leave his family to achieve that? 7 He does not know the answers in advance, and he
has little control over the answers that life supplies him. So much depends on chance, including
moral worth. This presents a paradox for moral philosophy because it conflicts with the intuition
that moral worth should depend on conduct that is in our control.
Moral luck may also arise in the more quotidian field of auto accidents. Everyone who
drives surely is careless at some point. Thankfully, not all carelessness injures someone else. But,
when it does, liability follows. The problem this situation presents for moral philosophy is not
that the law assigns responsibility on the basis of outcomes, but rather that the law may be in line
with moral intuition. 8 Indeed, it was both Williams’ and Nagel’s intuition that both observers and
the drivers themselves will draw a moral distinction between the driver who runs over a
5

Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, 50 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y (SUPP.) 115 (1976), reprinted in MORAL
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pedestrian and the driver who does not, even though their conduct was equally blameworthy (or
not) the moment before the accident occurred, and the difference in outcomes is entirely due to
luck. 9 This presents a paradox because it conflicts, not only with the intuition that moral worth
should depend on things that are in an actor’s control, but also with the intuition that like
behaviors should be treated alike. After all, both drivers were equally careless. How can we at the
same time think that (all other things being equal) the two drivers do and do not occupy the same
moral position?
One answer is to say that one of these two conflicting intuitions is wrong and that the two
equally careless drivers do not actually occupy a different moral position, despite the fact that
only one of them caused an accident. Therefore, there is no moral luck problem in the auto
accident situation. Recent work by David Enoch and Andre Marmor advances this argument.
They argue that, properly understood, the morality of the drivers’ conduct rests only on matters
that are in the drivers’ control and, thus, a moral assessment that places the lucky driver on a
higher plane than the unlucky driver is mistaken. 10
If we accept their assumption that moral assessments require fidelity to the control
condition, then there is little to disagree with in Enoch and Marmor’s account. If moral
assessments depend entirely on matters that are in our control, then there is no moral luck in the
auto accident situation (or anywhere else). Of course, their insistence on the control condition sets
aside the relationship between morality, feelings of regret, and emotion that Williams sought to
bring into philosophy. For this reason, and no doubt others, defenders of the idea of moral luck
surely would resist Enoch’s and Marmor’s move.
Another answer is to say that Williams’ and Nagels’ intuition regarding the moral
distinction between the two drivers is empirically rather than analytically wrong. In other words,
there may be situations in which, all things considered, the moral assessments that people make
depend on outcomes that are beyond an actor’s control, but auto accidents are not one of those
situations. 11 The argument here is that the unlucky driver who causes an accident does not regard
the fact of the accident as affecting the moral evaluation of his actions. Driving too fast, talking
on the cell phone, or whatever other careless act caused the accident was negligent and
regrettable, but it was simply bad luck that brought this act together with all the other
contingencies that were necessary to produce the accident. By the same token, the careless but

9
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lucky driver who sees or hears about the accident thinks to himself, “There but for the grace of Gd go I,” and blames himself for driving carelessly as much (or as little) as the unlucky driver.
I have some affinity for this middle ground, but I am not ready to give up on Williams’
and Nagel’s intuition. I can easily imagine cases in which an auto accident presents the
opportunity for a driver to reflect on the morality of his actions and to judge them more harshly
than he would have if the accident had never occurred, particularly when the harm to the victim is
severe. Yes, it was bad luck that brought the driver’s careless act together with all the other
contingencies, but the fact of the accident heightens his awareness of the risks he ran and the
opportunity he had to avoid those risks. In Enoch’s and Marmor’s account, this driver is mistaken
about the significance of the accident to his moral standing, but nevertheless he assesses the
morality of his driving differently than he would have had his luck been better that day. 12
For present purposes, it is not necessary to decide whether this assessment should be
regarded as mistaken. Whatever the moral significance, tort liability clearly depends on luck. We
can choose whether to drive too fast around a blind bend in the road, but we cannot choose
whether someone is crossing the road on the other side of the bend. And we cannot choose the
age, income, or health of that person, or most of the other circumstances that affect the tort law
measure of the damages owed for driving too fast. “Moments of carelessness” can lead to
“massive loss,” in Jeremy Waldron’s memorable words. 13
This luck in liability — what I will call “liability luck” — poses a challenge to the
fairness of tort law whether liability luck matters to moral assessments or not. If there is no moral
distinction between lucky and unlucky careless drivers, then the challenge is obvious: why should
tort law blame the unlucky driver when the lucky driver is equally blameworthy? Even if there is
a defensible moral distinction between them, why should the unlucky driver pay so much and the
lucky driver nothing when they both drove with the same lack of care? Why should tort liability
and damages leave so much to chance?

II. AUTO LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE TAMING OF LIABILITY LUCK
The prospect of taming chance figures prominently in the history of insurance. 14 The potential for
insurance to tame chance posed an important challenge to Divine Providence (an ancient solution
for the moral problems posed by chance), creating real problems for the development of the
12
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insurance market well into the 19th century. 15 The potential for insurance to tame chance presents
an obvious reason to consider whether liability insurance might do so in the tort law context.

A. Liability Insurance and Liability Luck in Tort Law
As legal philosophers have observed, liability insurance does have the potential to tame some
aspects of luck in tort law. 16 In theory, liability insurance can address both of the financial aspects
of the liability luck problem just described. First, by providing a fund for the payment of massive
losses, liability insurance can prevent a moment of carelessness from leading to massive loss for a
careless person. Second, because nearly everyone contributes to this liability loss fund, the lucky
careless drivers also pay for the injuries caused by the unlucky.
For liability insurance to completely address these aspects of liability luck in practice,
however, two requirements would have to be met. The liability insurance would need to be
coextensive with the liability in question, so there would be no occasion for a momentary lapse to
lead to a significant uninsured liability. And the price of the liability insurance would need to be
based on the individual’s propensity to engage in risk-creating behavior, not on outcomes. The
next Section assesses in very general terms whether the pattern of automobile liability insurance
in the U.S. meets these requirements.

B. Automobile Liability and Insurance in the United States
Auto insurance arrangements and requirements in the U.S. vary from state to state largely in
detail rather than in fundamental respect. The core insurance aspects of the insurance business are
regulated exclusively at the state level, but auto insurance is to a significant extent advertised and
sold in a national market. Moreover, there are national organizations that actively promote their
auto liability and insurance agendas in legislatures and insurance departments across the country.
As a result, there is a national pattern to auto liability and insurance, the following features of
which are most relevant to liability luck concerns.
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VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1979). Cf. Carol Weisbrod, Insurance and the Utopian Idea, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 381 (2000)
(reviewing contemporary moral objections to insurance).
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Keating, supra note 3, at 29 (“Negligence mitigated by the institution of liability insurance is fairer than
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from the negligent who do not. It is fairer to neutralize the arbitrary effects of luck than to let it wreak
havoc with people’s lives.”); see also Waldron, supra note 3, at 388, 397 n.21; Gary Schwartz, The Ethics
and Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 323 (1989).
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First, auto insurance is mandatory in all but a very few states. 17 In the vast majority of
states, the relevant auto accident and insurance system involves traditional negligence liability
and liability insurance combined with uninsured motorists’ insurance. 18 It is this traditional
negligence regime that I will consider, because it is the regime that is most likely to pose the
moral luck problem that philosophers have considered.
Second, the scope of the required auto insurance policy is very broad. Auto insurance
covers essentially all bodily injuries that an at-fault driver causes to other people, as long as any
one of the following participants in the accident has an insurance policy: the at-fault driver, the
owner of that driver’s car, the injured person, or the owner of the car that the injured person
occupied. 19 The standard auto insurance policy provides liability protection for an insured person
when he or she drives any car, and it provides liability protection for any authorized driver of an
insured car. In addition, it provides uninsured motorists protection for an at-fault injury whenever
there is no other insurance covering the defendant. 20 In that case, the uninsured motorists’
protection of the injured person (or the owner of the car in which that person was riding)
functions like the missing liability insurance of the driver who caused the accident.
Third, notwithstanding the very broad scope of the required auto insurance policy, the
legally mandated amount of insurance is quite low relative to the losses that can result from a
serious auto accident. A typical “mandatory minimum” amount of auto bodily injury liability
coverage is $25,000 per person injured in an accident and $50,000 maximum per accident, and
some states permit even lower amounts of insurance. 21 The practical effect of these low limits is
exacerbated in many states by the “collateral source rule” (which allows plaintiffs to include in
their damages losses covered by first party insurance such as health insurance and workers
compensation), in combination with subrogation by insurers who provided any collateral benefits.
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See Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on
Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 362 tbl.1 (2004).
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19
There are some exceptions to coverage, none of which seem likely to leave defendants without insurance
in a large numbers of cases. See generally, Irvin E. Schermer and William J. Schermer, Automobile
Liability Insurance at §§ 6:1-6:24 (4th Ed. 2004) (reviewing and collecting cases regarding standard
exclusions in auto insurance policies).
20
Also, if the amount of insurance provided by the plaintiff’s uninsured motorists coverage is greater than
the amount of insurance provided by the defendant’s bodily injury liability coverage, then the victim’s
insurance is available to pay the difference between those two policy amounts (if the damages reach that
amount).
21
See Robert H. Joost, Automobile Insurance and No Fault Law Table 4-3 at 4-92 (2d Ed. 2002) (listing
mandatory liability insurance limits in U.S. jurisdictions without no-fault laws).
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As a result, the injured plaintiff sometimes has to share the inadequate liability insurance money
with a workers’ compensation or health insurance company. 22
Fourth, much higher amounts of auto liability insurance coverage are available on the
market, and many people buy additional coverage. Bodily injury liability limits of $100,000 per
person and $300,000 per accident have become a middle class norm, in part because auto-leasing
companies require their clients to purchase at least that amount of coverage. 23 Additional,
“umbrella” bodily injury limits of $1 million or more are increasingly common among upperincome drivers.
Fifth, notwithstanding the fact that the auto insurance limits often are less than the
nominal damages in a serious auto injury case, automobile accident lawyers report that individual
defendants almost never have to pay any of their own money to settle a claim or satisfy a
judgment. 24 As a result, auto accident cases are, in practice, about collecting insurance. 25 (I
address below three exceptions.)
Sixth, notwithstanding the fact that individual defendants almost never have to pay their
own money, auto liability insurance claims handling and litigation practices routinely lead
defendants to believe that they face a real risk of having to do so. Field research shows that the
threat of holding an individual defendant personally liable plays an important role in the
settlement of many cases. 26 Individual auto accident defendants almost never are repeat players in
the auto litigation game, so they are unlikely to appreciate the (usually) empty nature of this
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See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 275 (2001).
23
Public information on the distribution of insurance policy limits is very difficult to obtain. The Insurance
Information Institute recommends that individuals purchase auto liability limits of at least 100/300. See
Insurance
Information
Institute,
How
Much
Coverage
Do
I
Need?,
http://www.iii.org/individuals/auto/b/howmuchcoverage/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
24
Baker, supra note 21; see also Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
603 (2006).
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Closed Claims, 1990-2003, J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2007). However, the medical malpractice context
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medical malpractice context.
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assets are exposed).
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threat. 27 Thus, they very likely will fear that an auto lawsuit involving a serious injury in fact
could force them to pay real money.
Seventh, the bureaucratization of the automobile insurance claims adjustment process
means that the vast majority of automobile liability claims are settled, typically without formal
admission of fault (although the insurance company’s record of the settlement will be treated as
an admission of fault for purposes of future liability insurance purchases), and many of those
claims are settled without a lawsuit or other public record of the claim. Except in serious injury
cases in which there is a large insurance policy available to pay the damages, adjusters and
plaintiffs’ lawyers settle these cases according to “rules of thumb” — simplified approximations
of what they believe would be the result on average were the cases actually to go to trial. 28 In
many cases the driver who caused the accident may not even find out whether a claim was filed
or paid.
Finally, the individual driver’s propensity to be careless matters very little in the pricing
of auto insurance. There are some pricing factors that seem likely to correlate in the aggregate
with the propensity to be careless. For example, the additional premiums traditionally charged for
teenage drivers reflect the fact that on average they are less careful than older drivers. More
recently, some auto insurance companies have begun using predictive pricing models based on
credit scores or other non-obvious factors (e.g. smoking) that are correlated with the propensity to
file or be subject to an auto insurance claim. In addition, auto insurance pricing contains a modest
experience-rating component that primarily reflects outcomes — i.e. the number of accidents —
and in some cases traffic violations such as speeding tickets. In the aggregate, these outcomes are
likely to correlate with the propensity to be careless. Nevertheless, the pricing that results is at
most only loosely connected with an individual driver’s propensity to be careless — because of
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Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
28
Ross put it this way:
Adjustment of insurance claims compromises the legal mandate for individualized treatment
with the need of a bureaucratic system for efficient processing of cases. This compromise can
be observed at many points in the processes of investigation and evaluation. Investigation is
vastly simplified, for instance, by presumptions as to liability based on the physical facts of
the accident. Accidents are thus seldom individualized to an insurance adjuster or a claims
attorney. Rather, they are rear-enders, red-light cases, stop sign cases, and the like, and the
placement of an accident into one of these categories ordinarily satisfies the requirements for
investigation of liability. . . .
H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT
135 (1970). He also observed that “An injury situation that can qualify a claim as a ‘big case’ may receive
something of the individualized treatment envisaged by the appellate courts.” Id.
9

the difficulty of observing that propensity and because of the dominant effect of other variables
such as the location of the residence where the car is garaged. 29

C. Auto Insurance and Liability Luck
As this brief description suggests, auto insurance in the U.S. substantially mitigates the financial
consequences of liability luck in the auto accident context. Moments of carelessness do not
actually produce massive loss for defendants in auto cases, because almost all auto liability
payments come from insurance companies. Moreover, both the lucky and the unlucky pay for the
injuries caused by the unlucky, through liability insurance premiums.
In addition, the auto insurance claims adjustment process reduces whatever additional
blame an ordinary tort lawsuit might be thought to impose on a careless driver. The routine,
confidential settlement means that there is no public expression of blame. Even if a lawsuit is
filed, the expression of blame is “public” only in a formal sense. Only in the rare case that
proceeds to trial is there any official determination of fault. Settlements do not explicitly blame
the driver, and, because the settlement “rules of thumb” do not perfectly map on to tort doctrine,
there is room for a driver to argue that the fact of the payment does not mean that the accident
was in fact his fault. For these reasons, an auto accident claim or settlement seems quite unlikely
to add to whatever private or self-inflicted blame has already followed from the careless conduct,
the accident, or the injury itself. After all, obviously the driver does not need the lawsuit itself to
learn that accident occurred, or to reflect on the morality of his driving. 30
On the other hand, the unlucky drivers who face liability for serious auto accidents are
likely to fear that they face significant financial loss, even if the repeat players in the tort game
know that defendants almost never have to pay their own money. 31 Moreover, even a driver with
29

John B. Connors & Sholom Feldblum, Personal Automobile Cost Drivers, Pricing, and Public Policy, 85
PROC. CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y 370, 387-98 (1998) (explaining that location is a proxy variable for a
variety of factors such as the compensation system in effect, the physical and economic environment, and
other institutional factors that have a, largely ex post, effect on the costs of accidents). Cf. Patrick Butler,
Driver Negligence vs. Odometer Miles: Rival Theories to Explain 12 Predictors of Auto Insurance Claims
(Am. Risk & Ins. Ass’n Working Paper No. 755 , 2006) (arguing that activity level as measured in
odometer miles is a better unifying theory for auto risk classification than driver negligence and that the
predictors actually used by auto insurance companies better correlate with odometer miles than
negligence); Aaron S. Edlin, Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance, in ECONOMICS OF AN IMPERFECT
WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 53 (Richard Arnott et al. eds., 2003) (arguing that
odometer miles would be a better risk-based pricing system and explaining that insurers do not price on that
basis because monitoring is costly and the benefits would accrue to consumers rather than insurers).
30
Although clearly outside the scope of this Article, some medical malpractice lawsuits may be different in
this regard. I can imagine a lawsuit teaching a doctor that his practice standards had not kept pace with
developments in the field and, thus, were morally compromised in a way that he had not appreciated.
31
Indeed, fear and emotional distress are significant enough that courts across the U.S. award damages
against insurance companies that unreasonably refuse to settle a liability insurance claim notwithstanding
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adequate liability insurance is singled out and required to cooperate with the insurance company,
with at least some resulting aggravation and inconvenience. Finally, the unlucky pay somewhat
more for their auto insurance than the lucky because of experience rating.
So outcomes do matter to some degree, even taking auto insurance into account, though
far less than is suggested by tort doctrine. 32 Moments of carelessness do not lead to massive loss
for defendants, but they can lead to moderate loss, some of which comes in the form of injured
feelings, aggravation and, possibly, diminished self-assessment (but the latter seems likely to
follow, if at all, from the fact of the accident, not the resulting liability). In addition, auto liability
insurance premiums depend in part on outcomes. Thus, auto insurance softens but does not
entirely mitigate auto liability luck in the U.S.

D. Special Cases: Drunk Driving, Underinsurance, and Some Severe Injuries
Three exceptions to the usual pattern are drunk drivers, drivers with substantial assets who do not
purchase adequate insurance, and, less commonly, ordinary drivers who cause a death or very
severe injuries. Qualitative research suggests that these drivers are more likely to be made to pay
out of their own pockets for injuries they cause to others, though typically much less than needed
to cover the shortfall between the cost of the injuries and the amount of available insurance. 33
Thus, tort law subjects these drivers to more substantial liability luck.
In one sense, all three of these special cases can be understood as underinsurance cases:
all these drivers could have purchased enough auto liability insurance to cover the full damages in
even a very serious case (and in some jurisdictions even punitive damages). 34 For this reason,
these cases involve what philosophers have called “option luck” (luck in outcomes that follow
from a choice made under conditions of known risk) and are therefore less morally troubling than
cases that implicate brute luck (luck in outcomes that do not involve such choices). 35 Indeed,

the fact that the insurance companies did not cause any financial harm. See Campbell, 2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d
1134. Higher insurance policy limits can in at least some circumstances reduce the emotional distress that
accompanies being the defendant in a tort action, but liability insurance cannot completely eliminate it.
32
Cf. Tony Honoré, The Morality of Tort Law: Questions and Answers, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT LAW, supra note 3, at 73 (discussing the outcome responsibility aspect of tort law).
33
Baker, supra note 21; see also Zeiler et al., supra note 25 (noting that, in cases in which doctors
contributed to the payment of the damages, the amount of those payments was small relative to the amount
paid by the insurance company).
34
Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 101; Catherine M.
Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 409 (2005).
35
See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 293
(1981).
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once liability insurance is widely available, any liability for which liability insurance could have
been purchased is an example of option luck. 36
As this generalization reveals, however, the concept of option luck does not help explain
these three special cases. In every case in which the damages exceed the available insurance, the
distinction between brute luck and option luck would provide justification for demanding full
damages — not just the insurance money — from the defendant. The fact that accident occurred
represents brute luck, while the gap between the damages and the defendant’s liability insurance
represents option luck. 37 Yet plaintiffs rarely demand that defendants fill this gap, except in the
three special cases. This pattern requires further explanation.
Drunk drivers. In the U.S., drunk-driving cases are different from ordinary auto accident
cases at least in part because of the salience of drunk driving as a subject of public concern. 38 A
longstanding grassroots advertising and public education effort has transformed drinking and
driving from a peccadillo into a serious wrong. 39 Seen in this way, tort law in action treats drunk
drivers differently because drunk drivers deserve to be punished more severely under prevailing
social norms. When drunk drivers are required to pay blood money, that money is best
understood as punishment, not compensation. When it comes to punishment, it seems we are
more prepared to leave “something to chance.” 40 Indeed, the exposure to chance can be
understood to be part of the punishment. 41
Underinsurance. While the qualitative research on underinsurance and blood money is
anything but precise, that research suggests that the social obligation to purchase liability
insurance extends beyond the mandatory minimum coverage specified in automobile insurance

36

Thank you to David Enoch for this observation.
It could be argued that in deciding to drive a person accepts a risk of injury and, thus, the injury
represents option luck from the plaintiff’s perspective as well. The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s situation
can be distinguished on at least two grounds, however. First, no amount of insurance can indemnify the
plaintiff for bodily injury (think about pain as a deductible or coinsurance), while insurance can easily
indemnify the defendant’s potential financial loss. Second, at least in negligence regimes, the plaintiff is
less blameworthy than the defendant. If the plaintiff is a pedestrian, there are additional reasons for
distinguishing between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s situation.
38
See generally H. LAURENCE ROSS, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING: SOCIAL POLICY FOR SAVING LIVES
(1992); JOSEPH GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKING-DRIVING AND THE SYMBOLIC
ORDER (1984).
39
See, e.g., SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE DRINKING DRIVER (Michael D. Laurence et al. eds., 1988).
40
See David Lewis, The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 53 (1980).
Whether punishment should be subject to chance is an important question that is beyond the scope of this
Article. See NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING (1999).
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Cf. Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443
(2004) (reporting experimental research concluding that uncertainty increases the deterrent impact of
sanctions). Although I am avoiding consequentialist arguments in this Article, there are deterrence
arguments in favor of punishing drunk drivers more severely than other drivers.
37
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statutes. 42 This social obligation is not unlimited — otherwise pursuing at least some amount of
money beyond the insurance policy limits would be the norm, not the exception. Field research
suggests that the obligation to insure is tied to the wealth of the defendant and the kinds of risks
that the defendant knew she was imposing on others. The wealthy have an obligation to purchase
more liability insurance than the middle class, and an obstetrician has an obligation to purchase
more insurance than an internist. 43 When defendants have not lived up to this obligation, the
blood money that they are required to pay is best understood as a consequence for their violation
of the social norm. Absent explicit legal requirements for purchasing insurance to satisfy this
social obligation to insure, there is no other way to enforce that obligation.
Severe injuries. This last category is even more difficult to identify with precision.
Sometimes defendants who have purchased an amount of insurance that would seem to satisfy the
social obligation to insure are nevertheless required to pay blood money when the victim died or
the injuries were very severe. The explanation supplied by field research is that the plaintiffs or
the plaintiffs’ surviving family members want to make these defendants suffer. 44 This reflects a
desire for retribution that is similar to that in the drunk driving case, but without the criminal law
enforcement overtones. Whether tort law in action should play this retributive role in these auto
accident cases is an interesting and important question. 45 Whatever the correct answer to this
question, however, the logic of demanding blood money in these cases is different from
demanding the liability insurance money in an ordinary tort case.
Summary. In all three of these special cases, defendants are exposed to luck beyond that
in the ordinary auto accident case, but the extent of this luck is less than suggested by reference to
tort doctrine alone. Moreover, these cases are easily distinguishable from the mass of auto
accident cases. The blood money payments in the drunk driving and serious injury cases represent
an explicit demand for punishment. And the blood money payments in the underinsurance cases
constitute the enforcement mechanism for the social obligation to insure. Accordingly, these
exceptions do not undercut the general claim that liability insurance substantially mitigates
liability luck in the auto accident context.
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Baker, supra note 21, at 296-97.
Id.
44
Id.
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See, e.g., Kenneth Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 113 (1990) (discussing retributive justice).
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III. LIABILITY LUCK AND THE LIABILITY/NO-FAULT DEBATE
As noted earlier, some legal philosophers have used liability luck arguments to question the
fairness of fault in existing tort doctrine and to argue for replacing fault-based auto liability with a
no fault auto insurance system. In light of my conclusion that insurance substantially mitigates
liability luck in the auto accident context, it will come as no surprise that I also conclude that
concerns about liability luck do not provide a substantial basis for eliminating fault from the auto
liability equation.
I will focus here on liability luck arguments made by Jeremy Waldron and Gregory
Keating. Waldron uses arguments about liability luck to argue in favor of replacing fault with no
fault in “Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss.” In that essay, he begins by setting liability
insurance aside in order to examine tort liability on its own, reasoning that if tort liability “needed
the practice of third party insurance to make it just — then we would have to consider whether
there are better ways of achieving that outcome than by combining tort liability and third party
insurance in this fashion.” 46
Using a variation on Williams’ auto accident, Waldron shows that there are two distinct
aspects to liability luck: (a) a lack of proportion between blameworthiness and the amount of
liability in many cases, and (b) fact that the lucky careless driver gets off free despite being
equally blameworthy. He argues that these liability luck problems pose a serious challenge to the
fairness of tort liability. Then, borrowing from David Lewis’s idea of a punishment lottery, he
identifies a technical answer to this perceived unfairness in liability luck: tort law treats the lucky
and unlucky drivers equally in the sense that both are exposed to the identical liability lottery.
This answer barely works for him; it seems clear that it would not be satisfactory for ordinary
drivers. 47
There is little to disagree with in Waldron’s analysis so far. Were he to put liability
insurance back into the equation at this point, he could hardly fail to agree that liability insurance
reduces whatever injustice of the tort system is attributable to liability luck. But he does not put
liability insurance back into the equation. Instead, he moves on to consider the justice of a no
fault auto accident compensation system in which the people injured in accidents apply directly
for payment to a compensation fund. 48 Then he compares this no fault alternative to an imaginary
tort law system without liability insurance. Not surprisingly, he believes that drivers should prefer
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Waldron, supra note 3, at 389.
Id. at 401-07.
48
Id. at 406.
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no fault because a no fault compensation scheme does not expose them to liability luck. He
concludes on this basis that tort liability is “unattractive as an alternative to [no fault] schemes.” 49
With respect, I don’t believe that this reasoning adequately supports the conclusion, at
least not if that conclusion is met to apply to actual practices. A persuasive argument in favor of
shifting actual practices to a no fault compensation approach requires engaging the fact of
widespread liability insurance, not a comparison with a hypothetical world in which there is no
liability insurance. No functioning liability approach to automobile accidents has ever existed
independent of liability insurance. 50 As insightful as Waldron’s exploration of liability luck
clearly is, the no fault argument that he constructs from liability luck does not inform the public
policy debate because it neglects to take liability insurance into account.
In a very recent article, Gregory Keating does make the requisite direct comparison. 51
Keating examines what he calls “enterprise liability” (a form of strict liability) as his preferred
alternative to fault, so the relationship between his and Waldron’s analyses may not be
immediately clear. Yet, strict liability and no-fault can be nearly equivalent in the ordinary auto
accident situation. 52 Provided that drivers are equally likely to be victims and injurers, strict
liability can be designed to function nearly identically to a no-fault insurance approach, as long as
that liability is accompanied by mandatory liability insurance. 53 The main practical differences
49

Id. at 408:
The answer seems to me to be obvious: if there was ever a case for maxi-min, this is it. If
people opt for the liability lottery, drivers face a non-trivial chance of complete ruin if they
lose — all for the hope of a gain which consists simply of not losing anything if they win. . . .
The insurance behavior of thousands of individuals who are in fact exposed to the liability
lottery gives us a clear indication of drivers’ preferences in regard to these alternative arrays
of payoffs.
In setting up this answer, he makes a point that is oddly mistaken: “the question seem to be one for the
drivers, since the victims should receive the same (full) compensation, provided each scheme is perfectly
administered on its own terms.” Fault-based schemes do not provide compensation to people who are
injured without fault or by their own fault, so the victims do not “receive the same (full) compensation” in
both schemes.
50
See KENNETH ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY (forthcoming, Harvard University Press, 2008)
(documenting the symbiotic relationship between liability and liability insurance in a variety of fields,
including auto accidents).
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See Keating, supra note 3.
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See Gregory Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L.
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World War II (strict liability for drivers who cause accidents, together with mandatory liability insurance to
make sure they have the resources to honor that liability). See Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality:
Automobile Accidents, Insurance and the Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919-1941, 4
CONN. INS. L.J. 521 (1998).
53
People are equally likely to be auto accident victims and injurers only if they are drivers. In that case the
most obvious likely difference between no fault and strict liability with mandatory liability insurance
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between no fault and strict liability in the auto accident context would be the following: (1) under
no fault, the injured person’s insurance company would pay the damages, while under strict
liability the insurance company of the driver who caused the accident would pay the damages;
and (2) under no fault, the driver in a single car accident would be eligible for insurance
compensation, while under strict liability that driver would have no one else to hold liable and,
thus, would not be able to recover.
As Keating recognizes, once we take liability insurance into account, the difference
between fault and no-fault is not the possibility of massive loss for drivers who injure other
people. Liability insurance easily eliminates that possibility. Instead, the difference for these
drivers is expressive. Only a fault-based approach labels the behavior that led to the accident as a
wrong. Absent a fault requirement, an auto accident claim provides no occasion to distinguish
between careful and careless behavior, because nothing of importance to that claim turns on that
distinction. For that reason, Keating concludes that no-fault “mitigates the effects of ‘moral
luck.’” 54
Keating’s concern about the expressive unfairness of the fault approach lies some
distance from the specter of massive loss from moments of carelessness raised by Waldron.
Taking auto liability insurance into account, the choice between fault and no fault matters
comparatively little for drivers who cause accidents. In either case, it is an insurance company
that pays the accident victims. And in either case the insurance premiums that all drivers pay are
affected very little by liability luck.
Of course there is the expressive difference that Keating isolated. But, as previously
described, the social process of insurance claims adjustment reduces this expressive difference
between fault and no fault. Whatever expressive impact from a negligence claim survives the
insurance adjustment process surely pales in moral significance in comparison to the impact of
the negligence requirement on victims. The negligence requirement means that only those who
are injured by an at-fault driver are eligible for auto insurance compensation. Negligence liability
leaves out those who are injured without fault or through their own fault. A no fault approach
includes them. Assessing the justice dimensions of the choice between fault and no fault requires
considering this difference.

concerns the treatment of single car accidents in which the only person injured is the person driving that
car. Accidents involving commercial vehicles present a different situation that is outside the scope of this
inquiry. Similarly, accidents involving victims who are not drivers (e.g., children, residents in some large
cities) also present a different case.
54
Keating, supra note 3, at 5 (arguing that strict liability “attributes accidents to the activities which are
pervasively responsible for them rather than to individual actors who happen to occasion them”).
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If we believe that being injured through the fault of another increases the moral
entitlement to compensation, then linking compensation and fault makes sense. In that case, the
policy choice would be between the existing regime (negligence liability plus liability insurance)
and an alternative, fault-based insurance regime in which victims make claims directly against an
insurance fund rather than having to bring a claim against the at-fault person. 55 But if fault
provides no greater moral entitlement to compensation, then the fairness case for the negligence
liability and insurance approach weakens considerably. In that case, why should the victim’s
ability to recover turn on whether she was lucky enough to be injured by a careless driver? These
are just some of the important and difficult questions that must be answered in order to determine
whether moving to no fault would lead to a more just approach to auto liability and
compensation.

CONCLUSION
Auto liability insurance narrows the difference between fault and no-fault and substantially
mitigates liability luck in auto accidents. Auto liability insurance goes a long way toward
providing broad auto accident victim compensation. 56 Auto liability insurance largely eliminates
the problem of “moments of carelessness and massive loss” for defendants (except in the special
cases I addressed, and even in those cases, the problem is smaller than tort doctrine suggests).
And the bureaucratization of the liability insurance claiming process makes transaction costs and
social (blame) consequences significantly lower than what a typical torts student or observer
might think. 57
Of course, auto liability insurance does not eliminate all differences between fault and no
fault. No fault would provide compensation to people injured without fault or through their own
fault, and it may provide compensation with somewhat lower transaction costs. But unless no
fault substantially reduces the level of benefits presently provided to people injured through fault,
no fault would be more expensive because more people would recover. This means that moving
to no fault would require either (a) taking money away from people injured at fault to give to
people injured without fault (or through their own fault) or (b) devoting more resources to
automobile accident compensation. In addition, some empirical research suggests that no fault
may increase the number of automobile accidents, so that moving to no-fault may increase the
55

Cf. Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REV.
143 (1990) (articulating an approach to tort liability that is analogous to such an insurance scheme).
56
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number of people injured in accidents. 58 Concern about these potential new victims provides yet
another possible justification for the existing negligence liability and insurance approach.
In short, considering whether to make the move from fault to no fault for auto accidents
involves resource allocation questions that present difficult moral choices. Utilitarian reasoning
and empirical research are unlikely to provide adequate answers on their own. 59 We can use all
the help we can get from moral and legal philosophy. But we are not going to find that help in the
moral luck literature. Once we take auto insurance into account, the moral questions that matter
most concern the effect of the legal regime on people who are, or who might be, injured in auto
accidents — not the effect on the drivers who injure them.
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See Cohen & Dehejia, supra note 16.
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